Aviation security, an arcane subject that was once somewhat esoteric, is now routinely referred to and discussed by much of our society. The startling thing is that many speak of this subject with a certain smugness that infers a profound knowledge. Some of our media pundits knowingly talk at length about the status of the government’s efforts to make improvements in the aviation safety arena. We also have countless wannabe aviation security experts expounding at length in both our print and visual media on the subject. Yet there are sometimes troubling gaps in the articulation of aviation security issues and reality. We just saw some of that fantasy versus reality in media reporting and discussion of the early November 2010 Yemini terrorists attempt to move bombs on both passenger and cargo aircraft.

Several things have contributed to this increased public awareness over the past two and a half decades, and have increased the attractiveness of this formerly arcane subject to the media and the public. The hijacking of TWA flight 847 from Athens, Greece on June 14, 1985 and the terrorist bombing of Air India 182 a few days later on June, 23, 1985 that killed 329 people, and the Libyan bombing of PAA Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 that killed 270 people awakened the world to the horrific consequences of aviation security failures. We should not have needed any further indications of these consequences but were once again awakened to the extreme consequences of aviation security failures on September 11, 2001 that killed upwards of 3,000 people, resulted in at least one war, and has cost, by some estimates, well over a trillion dollars.

Whenever one of these tragedies occurs we are reminded that mistakes in aviation are terribly unforgiving and that the aviation safety/security system is imperfect. In these instances the media tends to focus on anything they perceive to be wrong or sensational. Our U.S. system is based on the freedom of the media to address these issues and, in fact, our media’s focus on aviation security has often resulted in corrective measures to be implemented that would otherwise not have been taken. The overall contribution by the media to aviation security has generated increased attention that has sometimes been healthy, sometimes detrimental, and it has also contributed to the building of unachievable expectations. Added to these factors are the politics, duplicity and outright fraud on the part of Commissions and groups charged with fixing problems.

Our interests as passengers have been reasonably well served overall notwithstanding some sensationalism by some segments of the press. A number of good and not-so-good sources publicly venture into the debate on these safety issues. Most notable of these was the gaffe by the world renowned aviation safety and security expert, Pierre Salinger and his “expose” that a missile downed TWA 800 on July 17, 1996. Outrageous claims such as Pierre’s destroy themselves by their obvious inaccuracies and speculation, and the weight of contrary evidence. An alert and functioning independent media are the best remedies in these situations.

More difficult to dispel or deal with are those claims that come from reputable and otherwise credible sources, particularly from within the aviation trade media. These are not usually sensational but deal with extensive articles on how safe or unsafe U.S. aviation really is, or, as recently stated, the opinions of the aviation industry that is stated in the context of aviation security’s impact on aviation’s profitability. The history of these forays into this former arcane subject includes articles by one of Aviation Week and Space Technology reporters on August 18, 1997, pg. 37-41. Aviation Week is unquestionably the premier US trade publication in aviation worldwide. What is written there is perceived to have great credibility, and the author of these articles was a seasoned and respected reporter.

The two 1997 articles were erudite, well written and factual, as far as they go. Unfortunately that is just the problem – as far as they go. They were a gross example of the Trade Media writing for their audience, i.e., the trade media. Only once in the two articles does the author refer to a source outside the aviation industry, i.e., Senator John McCain (R. AZ). He did refer to anonymous individuals but he makes it plain that they are within the aviation industry, e.g., “A former FAA official . . . “, and “An official of one of the U.S.’ largest airlines . . . “

Other Aviation Week writings by this same reporter on the state of aviation security during the deliberations of the Gore Commission in 1995/96 noted that in the question of what to do and how much to spend on aviation security counter-measures “ . . . saner heads prevailed . . .“ in reducing the scope of security improvements. The inference here was that the industry was being railroaded into contemplating hundreds of millions of dollars of unnecessary safety expenditures. Based on these and other articles and editorials one could easily conclude that Aviation Week is more interested on what safety improvements will allegedly cost than the safety benefits required. The author’s comments were, in part, prompted by one of the Gore Commissioner’s proposal that a fee on each passenger’s ticket be levied that would be spent to enhance aviation safety through better aviation security. A fee on each passenger’s ticket was enacted by the U.S. Congress for that purpose after the 9/11 terror attacks.

Missing also from the 1997 Aviation Week articles was the very different views of some Congressmen such as Frank Wolf, (R. VA) who was the Chairman of a House Subcommittee that has oversight on the FAA’s Appropriations. More insidious however was the total absence of any opinion from the Victims Relatives Organizations, e.g., the 4 PAA 103 groups, the Value Jet group, the TWA 800 group, etc. Also available to the reporter and Aviation Week was a coalition of these groups, i.e., the National Air Disaster Alliance. For the most part these groups become very knowledgeable on aviation safety/security issues following some of the aforementioned tragedies, and in particular the deficiencies within the FAA who, up until shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was responsible for US aviation security. The Aviation Week reporter did not address these opinions - why?

As we have all heard many times, history repeats itself. Such seems to be the case in another Aviation Week article in its October 11, 2010 issue (pp 44 & 45) entitled “Letting Loose - Airports and airlines seek a new paradigm to locate threats, while castigating TSA.” In this article the Aviation Week reporter quotes “ACI-NA, ACI-Europe and Canadian Airports Council sources stating the need for “a more efficient, sustainable aviation security system.” It is interesting that these industry sources believe that the current aviation security system has a number of “redundancies” and needs to be made more efficient – meaning: less costly to the world’s airlines and airports. I do not question the need for airlines and airports to conserve their expenditures, nor their objective to achieve some efficiency. However, I would feel more comfortable if they would occasionally place some emphasis on effectiveness in their comments.

What may appear as redundant security measures to airlines and airports may well be multiple layers of security. The TSA claims that they have 20+ layers of security in the U.S. aviation security system. Individual layers of security systems are usually designed to target some specific threat and may well have some overlap with other layers in the system – but they are not, strictly speaking, redundant.

The same October 11 article quotes Robert Poole “director of transportation policy for the Reason Foundation, an advocacy group” who “suggests that as many as half of the daily flow of passenger traffic could qualify for trusted status and reduce the workload at airport checkpoints.” The reporter also quotes Kenneth Duncan, global director of security and travel facilitation for the International Air Transport Association (IATA) who “estimates that at least a third of the passengers under such a program could be treated as trusted and not pose a security problem.” Dunlap is also quoted as “looking for a new paradigm for security where the focus in on finding ‘bad people.’” A trusted person would presumably have to meet some specific background criteria that apparently was not specified by the Aviation Week reporter or may not have been addressed by the advocates of this security measure. In previous exchanges between Mr. Poole and me the criteria he has proposed is inadequate in my opinion to place a person in a trusted position where that person would not have to undergo the full aviation security screening requirements. Such criteria and pre-clearance should be much more rigorous than what I have seen proposed to date to meet my standards.

Actually, the airlines and airports, and Mr. Poole are correct that the vast majority of passengers do not pose a threat to aviation. My experience is that 99%+ of passenger do not constitute a threat to aviation safety. But, finding the less than 1% that may pose a threat is the dilemma faced by aviation worldwide. Said another way, identifying the 99%+ of those that do not pose a threat with acceptable certainty and excluding them from the full set of security screening measures is the real problem.

Advocates for a change in the current aviation security regimes around the world usually suggest that we rely more on intelligence, a risk management approach, etc. Mr. Poole of the Reason Foundation is quoted in the same October 11, 2010 article that “He believes a better security system would have emerged if Congress had adopted proposed legislation creating the TSA as a regulatory agency, setting performance standards and overseeing screening at airports by private businesses.” This was exactly what the US aviation security system was prior to the creation of the TSA after the 9/11 attacks. The system proposed by Mr. Poole failed miserably under the FAA and I cannot see it being successful under any new set of circumstances. This writer has debated this issue with Mr. Poole several times through exchanges of messages.

Mr. Poole was also quoted as saying “The U.S. has applied risk-management strategies in other transportation modes, including shipments and cargo, and has done so successfully.” If that statement was correct at one time it can it still be considered correct given the recent Yemini terrorist attempt to move bombs through aviation out of Sana’a, Yemen addressed to locations within the U.S.? All current indications are that the two bombs were discovered as a result of an intelligence flow – but even that claim is subject to some confusing data released by the several countries involved in locating and disabling the two devices. Mr. Poole is correct in that a risk management approach, if applied from a national standpoint, should have indicated that anything originating in Yemen, given its history of terrorism, might be a problem and special countermeasures should have been applied. There have been no public indications that the TSA was applying a risk-management approach for Yemeni cargo at the time of this bombing attempt. However, the Deputy National Security Advisor to President Obama has indicated that special attention has been given to cargo that originates in Yemen since the discovery of some suspicious cargo originating there in September 2010.

Not addressed in any of the Aviation Week articles was the use of Intelligence data to make aviation security more efficient. The improved collection and use of Intelligence is usually one of the primary things that non-security professionals usually advocate. In the Yemeni bombing attempt the U.S., UK, and others have cited the intelligence flow from Saudi Arabia as the key factor in locating and de-activating the two bombs. Such specific intelligence data is rare. Most intelligence is usually less specific and frequently indistinct and confusing. We were fortunate this time because of the alleged Intelligence but we should not rely on the expectation that we will always have this level of intelligence data to prevent future attempts to attack aviation.

According to the Los Angeles Times November 2, 2010 edition “The Yemen plot highlighted the capabilities of a determined and creative enemy, Pistole, said at a meeting of the global air industry in Frankfurt. He said he would ‘reshape our security approach’ to improve the agency’s focus on intelligence and new technology.” Exactly what Mr. Pistole (the TSA Administrator) plans to do in the way of improving the TSA reliance on intelligence is, as yet, unclear. Research and Development activities of security technology was a long-term on-going project under the FAA in pre-9/11 times and has been continued under the TSA. Unfortunately it usually takes from 5 to 15 years to exploit any given detection technology effort. This means that Mr. Pistole’s plans on technology development is unlikely to realize any quick results unless that technology development has already been underway for several years.

The recent Yemeni terrorist attempt to either bomb two or more airplanes in-flight, or a target within the U.S., illustrates that none of the aviation industry or the world’s governments have the power to control the actions of a determined adversary. Moreover, that adversary has the choice of the time and the methods that they use to attack aviation. The foregoing examples of a few selected attacks, and attempted attacks, indicate that we continue to see wishful thinking and actions on the part of the aviation industry and its trade media. The reality is that we do not have the capability to quickly and efficiently determine who the 1% “bad guys” are.

We can continue to incrementally improve our human detection capabilities through improved procedures and processes and develop and implement more effective technologies – such as the body scanners. But it is unrealistic to believe that we can make more than small incremental improvements in our efficiencies. First and foremost we must look to improvements in effectiveness. Unfortunately, the aviation industry seems to always look for efficiencies first – that is putting the proverbial cart before the horse.

Given the foregoing, has the U.S. aviation industry’s leading publication lost its capacity to see outside the industry’s narrow viewpoints, cost issues and resulting safety implications? When are the airlines, airports, and the industry trade magazines going to get the message that you are not the solo players in this vital safety issue?